Thursday, August 11, 2005
The noughties oil shock
Japanese who are old enough to remember sometimes refer, with disquiet, to the "oil shock" of the '70s. The impact of that event there may have been much more profound than it was in other first world countries.
The flowering in Japan of nuclear power stations, it's go-lightly approach in diplomatic relations with OPEC, the fortune spent on obtaining coal, the societal attention to energy conservation - all these things have a range of possible explanations. The residual oil shock mentality in a country of limited mineral resources can be argued to be a pervasive driver.
Are we in the west currently going through another oil shock? Can we learn from Japan in dealing with it?
2005 crude oil prices ascend daily, while wells are burned sabotaged in Iraq. Meanwhile Osama, estranged he of the Saudi elite, promises to bleed the United States to economic death (see, for example, his anti-Bush 2004 "election speech").
It takes no Einstein to imagine what avenues might be exploited to do just that, or to imagine what Osama-trodden avenues finance terrorism.
Oil and energy are the Achilles heel of the modern energy-driven world. The Salafists aim to kick it.
We can cheaply deride "greedy" oil companies and US "imperialism", but the safeguarding of oil resources is fundamental to basic elements of our lifestyle.
At the same time the suspect emotions and ambitions - not to mention the methods - of those who seek to assault said Achilles heel warrant a good deal more attention than they have been getting.
A Salafist aim seems to be to hold you and I - not just the corporate establishment that supplies and enables us - to ransom and blackmail.
The functioning of your car, your electric light, your TV and your fridge, and the availability of basic foods and supplies is potentially at risk. All, apparently, in the name of envy and hatred of US hegemony and what it represents.
Just as the '70s oil tremors led to less dependence in western countries on petroleum and improved oil conservation methods, we can reasonably hope for similar results from the present challenge.
In one sense, the heightened awareness of the fragility in oil supply lines wrought by the terrorist onslaught is a gift.
Kyoto didn't achieve such awareness.
It also failed to account for the huge increase in world oil demand fueled by economic growth in China, India and other places. Kyoto stifled new technologies in signatory countries and saddled minimal environmental offenders like New Zealand with billion dollar debt.
So the environmental initiative now being foreshadowed by Asia-Pacific nations is potentially of huge import. The mere fact that China, India, the US and Japan may be joint signatories signals seriousness. And in the background hovers the terrorist war, Kyoto misgivings ... and the potential nuclear threat posed by the likes of Iran and North Korea.
Said last-mentioned threat symbolises how much greater the stakes are now vis-a-vis the '70s. There is a hegemonic challenge now, like then, but it is a graver and more mortal one. That a part of the - effective - hegemonic response may potentially involve said Asia-Pacific nations symbolises the relative shift in economic power on this planet, a shift that has tellingly left in the cold countries where Salafist allies may principally be found.
Is the real weight of world economic power to be held successfully to ransom? Will Sharia, socialism and/or pure nuclear might tame democracy, technology and the free market?
The challenge posed by the Irans, North Koreas and Salafists of this world is a fearful one. We may regard them as blind or blinkered, but it is also true that throughout history blinkered men with a true aim have attained the heights. We have seen the success they have wrought politically, through "internationalist" avenues allied with the UN, and militarily and economically through terrorism and energy blackmail respectively.
But the real weight of world economic and political power doesn't belong with them. The future has for some time been shifting east, but futher east than the western Asian rim. Their threat poses a challenge, predicated on brutality and with a chance of success. But not if there is desire in the response to stand up for what is deserved.