Tuesday, April 12, 2005
Postscript to the Iran-Israel chat
A nice, welcome coincidence. Better than nothing.
That's how much of the world - those in the world that paid attention - might have initially reacted to the chance meeting reported to have taken place between Israeli President Moshe Katsav and Iranian leader Mohhamed Khatami at Pope John Paul II's funeral.
Now there is a postscript.
Israel is today reported to have handed, just a few days later, photographs of advanced and highly suspect Iranian nuclear facilities directly to US President Bush.
Linked to the same page of this report in the Khaleej Times is the February 25 commentary of Henry Kissinger, emphasizing the ambiguity and complexity involved in containing the nascent nuclear ambition of the likes of Iran. Way back then Dr. Kissinger said:
... By 2050, ...(Iran's)... population is projected to exceed that of Russia. ...
(N)ew nuclear weapons establishments may be used as a shield to deter resistance, especially by the US, to terrorist assaults on the international order. ... We should oppose nuclear proliferation even to a democratic Iran. ...
Proliferating countries invariably present their efforts as goals ... such as participation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or enhancing electricity generation. In Iran's case, this is clearly a pretext. For a major oil producer like Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of resources....
(S)everal European allies treat Iran's nuclear ambitions as ... defensive. In their view, they spring from Iran's geographic position, wedged as it is between nuclear neighbours or near-neighbours ć»India, Pakistan, Russia and Israel. They believe that Iran's nuclear impulse can be softened, perhaps even ended, by conciliatory diplomacy.
Diplomacy is about demonstrating to the other side both the consequences of its actions and the benefits of the alternatives. No matter how elegantly phrased, diplomacy by its very nature implies an element of and a capacity for pressure. ...
A nonproliferation policy must therefore achieve clarity on the following issues: How much time is available before Iran has a nuclear weapons capability, and what strategy can best stop an Iranian nuclear weapons program? How do we prevent the diplomatic process from turning into a means to legitimise proliferation rather than avert it? We must never forget that failure will usher in a new set of nuclear perils dwarfing those which we have just surmounted.
